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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
APPELLEE'S OPENING BRIEF

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee,

CaseNo.20040552-CA
vs.
Priority: No. 2

ALAN REED FITZ,

Appellant Not Incarcerated

Defendant/Appellant,

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(e) of the U.C A.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The only issue presented in this case is whether or not the trial court erred in finding that
the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant did not act
in self defense. "A defendant is entitled to an acquittal if based upon the whole evidence in the
case there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant acted in self-defense." State v.
Jackson. 528 P.2d 145,147 (Utah 1974).
Challenges to the sufficiency of evidence from a bench trial conviction are reviewed from
a "clearly erroneous" standard and the lower courts decision will only be overturned only if the
decision was against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Striebv. 790 P.2d 98 (Utah
App. 1990). This standard is less deferential that the standard applied to a verdict from a jury
trial due to the multi-member versus single fact finder and requires only that the evidence
presented not be contrary to the verdict. Id. (citations omitted).
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
Defendant Alan Reed Fitz appeals from a judgment, sentence and commitment of the
Fourth District Judicial Court after being convicted of assault, a class B misdemeanor, and
domestic violence in the presence of a child, a class B misdemeanor.
B. Prior History
The disposition of this case is correctly laid out in the defendant's brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly applied the state's self-defense statute and determined that the
defendant did not act in self defense. The nature of the danger the defendant faces was minimal
at best. The threat was no longer immediate as the victim had retreated and sat down on the
couch next to a small child and there was no probability that the force used by the victim in her
initial advance would have resulted in serious bodily injury.
FACTS
On or about September 26, 2003, at approximately 3:00 am., Deputy Murphy and Deputy
Scott of the Utah County Sheriffs Office were dispatched to 1803 Cedar Street in Eagle
Mountain on a report of a suspected domestic violence. (R. 10:8-16). She made contact with
Brenda Fitz. (R. 10:8-10). She was crying and carrying a very young baby, and invited the
deputies inside. (R. 11:22-25).
Upon entering the home, the deputies found man, the defendant, sitting in an easy chair
who was groggy and almost asleep. (R. 13:4-10). The deputies determined that some type of
2

altercation had taken place. (R. 13:22-24). The parties confirmed that they were married. (R.
14:7-9). After a brief investigation, the deputies determined that the defendant was the primary
aggressor in the incident. He was taken into custody on charges of simple assault, domestic
violence and domestic violence in the presence of a child. (R. 16:10-17). Later, a charge of child
endangerment was added also.
ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE STATE
HAD PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED AS SELF-DEFENSE.
The defendant correctly states that "[a] defendant is entitled to an acquittal if based upon
the whole evidence in the case there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant
acted in self-defense." State v. Jackson. 528 P.2d 145,147 (Utah 1974). Challenges to the
sufficiency of evidence from a bench trial conviction are reviewed from a "clearly erroneous"
standard and the lower courts decision will only be overturned only if the decision was against
the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Strieby, 790 P.2d at 98. This standard is less
deferential that the standard applied to a verdict from a jury trial due to the multi-member versus
single fact finder and requires only that the evidence presented not be contrary to the verdict. Id.
(citations omitted).
First and foremost, there is no question here that the defendant was guilty of an assault.
He admitted to such several times on the witness stand. (R. 63:24-64:4; R. 64:13-17; R. 75:1213). The trial judge found this to be the case. (R. 93:13-16). The defense has not challenged this.
Instead, the defendant's only argument is that his assault was a justifiable response to an
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aggressive attack by his spouse.
Utah law permits a person to defend himself when he reasonable believes that it is
necessary to defend himself against the imminent use of force. U.C.A. §76-2-402 states:
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to
the extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend
himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force.
However, that person is justified in using force intended or likely to cause death or
serious bodily injury only if he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary
to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third person as a result of
the other's imminent use of unlawful force, or to prevent the commission of a
forcible felony.
The statute also lays out a set of five considerations that courts may use in determining
whether or not the self-defense was justified.
(5) In determining imminence or reasonableness under Subsection (1), the trier of
fact may consider, but is not limited to, any of the following factors:
(a) the nature of the danger;
(b) the immediacy of the danger;
(c) the probability that the unlawful force would result in death or serious bodily
injury;
(d) the other's prior violent acts or violent propensities; and
(e) any patterns of abuse or violence in the parties' relationship.
The trial court appropriately applied these factors and correctly arrived at the following
conclusions: 1) The nature of the danger posed to the defendant was minimal. (R. 93:21); 2)
There was no immediacy of more attack because Ms. Fitz had retreated to the couch. (R. 93:2325); 3) There was no possibility that the force used would cause death or serious bodily injury.
(R. 94:1-2).
The court then weighed these factors against the fact that Ms. Fitz did have a history of
some violence toward the defendant. (R. 94:3-7); and a pattern of violence existed in the
relationship. (R. 94:10).
4

The State now undertakes the same analysis that the trial court undertook, using the
relevant case law from this jurisdiction.
I. Nature of the Danger.
The trial court found, and that State agrees, that Ms. Fitz was the initial aggressor in this
case. She appears to have launched a single, open-handed slap against her husband. (R. 63:1964:4). The Utah case with the closest affinity to this case is the case of State v. Gonzales. 545
P.2d 187 (Utah 1975). That case represents a somewhat similar fact pattern in that the victims
were the initial aggressors when then retreated, only to be re-engaged by the defendant. In that
case, the defendant drove his father to the liquor store. His father entered the store to make his
purchases and then returned. As he was walking back to the vehicle he was accosted by two
people. Id. at 188. The two were apparently drunk and requested money, which they were
refused. Id. The father fell against he car and it was disputed whether he was struck or whether he
fell due to his own intoxication Id.
The father was able to make it back into the vehicle, and the two men began moving
away. Id, At that point, the defendant got out of the car and called the men back. Id. One of him
them returned and struck the defendant with a "nunchucks" and the other punched him, causing
the defendant to fall to the ground. Id. The defendant then got to his feet, produced a gun and
shot one of the men. The man walked to the side of the vehicle and laid his hands on top of it.
The two spoke to each other for a moment before the defendant shot him again, killing him. Id.
The defendant then pursued the second victim, firing three shots.1 Id.
The defendant was charged with manslaughter but countered that he was acting in
lr

The case is somewhat vague but it appears that the second victim was unharmed.
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defense of himself and his father. Id. at 188-189. The court noted that "a defendant is entitled to
an acquittal if, based upon the whole evidence, there is a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he
acted in self-defense." Id. The court then stated that nothing in the case "compelled] a finding
that the defendant, when he fired the shots... was acting in defense of himself or his father. " Id.
The court found that "the record does discloses that at the time both shots were fired, the
father had gotten into the vehicle and was no longer in danger." Id. The court seems to have felt
that, despite the victim's use of the "nunchucks" the nature of this danger was insufficient to
warrant the defendant's response.
Here, the trial court found that the danger was minimal. (R. 93:21). Moreover, in his
testimony, the defendant admitted that this was the case. On cross-examination, when asked if
he was afraid she would cause seriously bodily injury, the defendant replied, "No." (R. 76:2477:1).
Thus, if an attack with a dangerous weapon such as nunchucks in Gonzales were not
sufficient to justify a claim of self-defense, the State fails to see how the mere fact of a slap
across the face, which the defendant admits posed no danger himself, is sufficient to justify the
defendant's actions.
II. Immediacy of the Danger.
In Gonzales, the court also found that at the time of the encounter, the victim was
"leaving the scene of his confrontation with [the father] when the defendant left the car and
called [the victim] and his companion back." Id. And that "after the first shot was fired, [the
victim] attempted to reach a place of safety when the second shot was fired." Id. The court
concluded that "the defendant acted from anger rather than in defense of himself or his father."
6

Id.
Here, the evidence is incontroverted that, like the victims in Gonzales, Ms. Fitz (the
initial aggressor) was retreating away from the couch and actually was able to sit down next to
her baby before the defendant reached her. The defendant admitted as much when he stated, "I
don't recall if she backed up or walked - turned and walked forward, but she sat down in the
corner of the love seat, and she had Kaylee next to her. I grabbed her arm and I socked her in the
shoulder, and that's about it." (R. 64:l-4).(see also R. 75:3-14)(emphasis added). Whereas the
defendant in Gonzales merely called the victims back to him, here, the defendant literally got up
off the couch where he was laying, walked across the room in pursuit of his wife, grabbed her
from a sitting position on the couch and punched her a minimum of two times. Moreover, unlike
the victims in Gonzales, who actually attacked the defendant after being called back, Ms. Fitz
made no apparent effort to re-engage in the fight with her husband when he pursued her.
Furthermore, like the defendant in Gonzales, it is quite clearfromthe record in this case
that the defendant struck his wife out of anger, not out of any attempt at self defense. On cross
examination he was asked, "Isn't it true that you hit your wife really at some portion during that
time because you lost your temper with her?" The defend responded, "Possibly." (R. 70:1-4).
He subsequently denied this. (R. 70:20). However, he admitted on cross examination that he did
indeed tell the investigating officer that he had lost his temper with his wife. (R. 70:17-71:4).
Finally, the defendant makes a tepid argument that, being asleep when he was struck, on
awakening he feared that an intruder had come into the home and attacked him. Whether or not
this is true, it is ultimately irrelevant since the defendantfreelyadmitted on cross that by the time
the assault occurred, he was well aware it was his wife he was striking. (R. 75:9-14).
7

III. Force Resulting in Death of Bodily Injury.
As noted above, both the trial court and the defendant stated that there was absolutely no
risk of death or bodily injury. The defendant also acknowledges this in his brief, but tries to
explain it away by pointing to the fact that the defendant was asleep and in a vulnerable position
and thus impaired his ability to perceive this. Nevertheless, in Gonzales, the defendant was
actually struck with a pair of nunchucks and knocked to the ground, yet the court held that his
response was unwarranted, despite the very obvious danger of serious bodily injury, because the
victim had retreated. Here, no matter what the defendant may have perceived his situation was
on awakening, the defendant admitted that by the time he reached his wife, he knew full well
who she was and what had happened. Thus, his response was completely unreasonable and
unjustified.
IV. Prior Violent Acts and Propensities.
The trial court found that Ms. Fitz did have some "violent propensities" and had engaged
in prior acts of violence. (R. 94:2-4). It is unclear, however, how the court weighted this factor
except that appears to have weighted in favor of the defendant. (R. 94:10-15). The testimony
was that Ms. Fitz had slapped her husband approximately once ever two weeks over a period of
about two years. (R. 94:6-7). The State asserts that, in this case, this fact mitigates against the
defendant's assertion of self-defense. In the State's view, the purpose of this factor is to help
measure the "reasonableness" of the defendant's response. If a person had violent proclivities,
and if the a potential victim knew of the proclivities, then his defense of self might be seen as
more reasonable under those circumstances. Here, however, the defendant was aware of his
wife's tendencies and also knew that her proclivities posed little or not threat to him. In fact, it is
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on record that in no prior instance did he ever feel sufficiently threatened to respond in kind to
her violent advances. (R. 62:1-7). Of course, the State in no way condones Ms. Fitz actions, but
notes this fact solely to point out that the defendant had other options to deal with his wife's
behavior rather than resorting to violence.
V. Patterns of Abuse and Violence.
The State views this factor much as it view the factor above. A pattern of abuse is
relevant to determine the reasonableness of the defendant's actions in defending himself. As
with the analysis given above, the State believes that a pattern of abuse did exist, but that the
pattern shows that the defendant was in little to no danger and this his response was
disproportion to the danger he faced. He knew that his wife suffered from mental instability (or
at least had done so in the past). (R. 62:11-63:8). And in all prior instances he dealt with the
situation by merely "restraining" her. (R. 63:9-12)
CONCLUSION
The State freely admits that the defendant was not the initiator of the physical altercation
in this case, nevertheless, his claim of self-defense cannot stand. The nature of the danger he
faced was slight and it was no longer immediate as his wife had retreated to the other side of the
room when he attacked her. The force of his wife's slap had no potential for serious bodily
injury, let alone death, and therefore is not a consideration. Moreover, his knowledge of his
wife's violent proclivities and their pattern of abuse should have clearly indicated to him that he
was in no danger and faced no threat that would have justified his use of violence against here.
The State, therefore, respectfully requests that this court deny the defendant's motion and affirm
the trial court's ruling.
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